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the extent to which anatomical impairment will cause
economic disability, we must first actually determine that
the doctor has certain extra-medical knowledge of his
patient. If he lacks this extra-medical knowledge his competency to answer should be challenged. But, if the extramedical factor is uncomplicated, there is a lack of necessity for admitting expert opinion on the point. As has been
determined, the only reason expert opinion evidence is
admitted is because the jury would be hard pressed or
unable to reach a proper conclusion without it.
The Shivers jury being apprised of anatomical disability by the medical witnesses, backed up by the plaintiff's
own testimony as to her physical and economic condition
could have reached a proper conclusion. This was the trial
court's position. The reversal on this ground by the Court
of Appeals is unfortunate.
DONALD NEEDLE.

Admissibility Of Opinions In Dying Declarations
Connor v. State'
Defendant left the house of his former wife, the decedent, after an argument between the two, and entered
his parked car. The decedent followed him, and while
standing at the door of the car demanded a promised
payment of $25. The defendant refused, and the decedent
moved directly in front of the car. As the defendant started
to slowly drive forward, the decedent refused to move
aside, and instead walked backward. There came a time
when the defendant did not "see her any more" at which
time he "gave it [the automobile] the gas." With this, the
automobile moved rapidly forward and crushed the decedent, causing her death some fourteen hours later. The
defendant appealed from a second degree murder conviction on the ground, inter alia, that evidence admitted at
the trial of a statement made by decedent to a policeman
at the scene of the crime, in which she classified the defendant's act as "no accident," was inadmissible as a dying
declaration due to its opinion form. The Maryland Court
of Appeals, in a case of first impression, rejected defendant's argument and stated that a dying declaration is not
1225 Md. 543, 171 A. 2d 699 (1961).
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rendered inadmissible merely because the decedent's statement was in the form of an opinion.2
Dying declarations, made under certain conditions, are
admissible in homicide cases under an exception to the
hearsay rule.3 The justification for the exception is based
on two broad grounds: necessity and reliability. The use
as evidence of the declaration in the form spoken is necessary since the victim is dead, and it is therefore impossible
for him to testify or to rephrase his words; yet he may
have been the only eye-witness to the acts and his testimony may be vital.
Other requirements of the exception tend to insure reliability sufficient to warrant reception despite the absence
of cross-examination or of the threat of a perjury prosecution. Courts require that the declarant be conscious of
impending death4 and that the declaration be made while
so conscious5 (satisfied in the instant case by the decedent's
request for a priest and expressed concern for the care of
her baby). In addition, death must actually ensue, although
not necessarily immediately Though the early cases required that the declarant be a believer in the hereafter,
the modern American cases admit "declarations of a person who would qualify as a witness in spite of his lack of
religious belief." These are the components of the very
exacting foundation necessary to make a dying declaration
admissible? The substance of the declaration presents
further problems. Broadly, it must be in connection with
the act which subsequently causes the death.9 In addition,
2
The Court, in so holding that the statement of the decedent made to a
police officer while she was awaiting the arrival of the ambulance was
admissible as a dying declaration, found it therefore unnecessary to discuss
the claim that the statement was not part of the so-called res gestae. In
this connection see statement of Judge Parker in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Mears, 64 F. 2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1933) :
"[A] statement made by an injured person as to the cause of his
injury is admissible if the time which has elapsed since the injury is
so short that he is still under the influence of the happening and his
statement presumptively a spontaneous expression growing out of it
and not the result of reason and reflection."
Hawkins v. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 A. 27 (1904).
'The declarant need not make a statement of such consciousness. It can
be inferred. MCCORMICK, EvENcE (1954) § 259. But if he had any hope
of recovery, the declaration will not be admitted. Worthington v. State,
92 Md. 222, 48 A. 355 (1901).
5People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E. 2d 48 (1949).
1 The "test is the declarant's belief in the nearness of death when he
made the statement, not the actual swiftness with which death ensued."
McConmicK, too. cit. supra, n. 4.
2 MORGAN, BAsIc PRoL.Ems O' EViDEN E (1957) 260-61.
'However, even though this foundation has been laid it does not
necessarily follow that the passions and prejudices which governed the
declarant in life will leave him as he faces death.
9 MORGAN, loc. cit. supra, n. 7.
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it is sometimes said that there must be no intent of the
declarant to suppress part of the truth."°
Even though a dying declaration could meet the foregoing requirements of the hearsay exception, there was a
common assumption, which the Court of Appeals properly
rejected, that it was inadmissible if it was in opinion form.
In a number of cases language can be found which
seems to support this common assumption, but, close examination of the cases indicates that the courts might well
have rested, and perhaps intended to rest, their decisions
on grounds separate from the opinion rule. Sometimes a
statement condemned vaguely as opinion - which in such
a case ought to involve merely the problem of a statement
in a form containing abstraction or conclusion - could be
more precisely excluded on such grounds as lack of firsthand knowledge, failure to meet the hearsay exception, or
unfair prejudice. In cases involving this sort of false labeling a court, unless it blindly follows the language of its previous decisions, might in a proper situation admit material
which is an opinion but unobjectionable on the other
grounds. Some examples of arguable false labeling follow.
The test of whether or not a dying declaration is an
opinion, according to one court, is "whether the statement
is the direct result of observation through the declarant's
senses, or comes from a course of reasoning from collateral
facts. If the former, it is admissible; if the latter, it is inadmissible."'1 Query: Is this not going to the testimonial
qualification of the declarant - i.e., his first-hand knowledge of the facts - rather than the inadmissibility of
opinions?"2
Dying declarations have also been excluded as "opinion"
when in fact the justification for exclusion was failure to
meet the hearsay exception requirement of reliability. In
Adams v. The People,13 the declarant stated that the act
of the accused was "accidental." The court said this was
opinion but later added that the dying declaration "affords
no evidence of anything more than a truly Christian
spirit... of one who... in his dying agonies, was willing
to forgive the malefactor." Though the result seems proper,
1oIbid.
11House v. State, 94 Miss. 107, 48 So. 3, (1909).
"The following cases failed to make the distinction and treated firsthand knowledge problems as opinion problems: Riddle v. State, 210 Ark.
255, 196 S.W. 2d 226, 228-229 (1946), where case turned on declarant's
first-hand knowledge; State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P. 2d 657 (1948)
Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471 (1912).
847 I1. 376, 380 (1868).
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it appears that absence of compelling motive to speak the
truth was the true ground for the exclusion.
Another opportunity for false labeling occurs where
the statement is not in connection with the act. In Walthall
v. State 4 the court said the dying declaration in which the
decedent blamed herself was a "conclusion" but ended its
reasoning by stating, "It [the dying declaration] would
convey to the jury no idea whatsoever of any part which
the deceased played in the particular transaction." If this
were so, the dying declaration was inadmissible simply
because it did not relate to the act and should have been
excluded on this valid hearsay ground."5
In the cases just mentioned, the courts, it is believed,
reached the correct results. However, even though they
mentioned the inadmissibility of opinions in dying declarations as the basis for their decisions, they are doubtful
authority for such an assertion, and should not be followed
on that ground.
Sometimes a dying declaration in opinion form is sensibly excluded because it has special characteristics not
present generally in opinions. For example, some courts
purporting to exclude dying declaration opinions have distinguished dying declarations which are submitted against
the accused from those submitted in his favor. In the former
case, wherever the statement is inflammatory, it is excluded
mainly because of creation of undue prejudice. If the
declarant were alive and testifying, he would not be permitted to use an opinion form of expression likely to inflame the passions of the jury, and the danger from such
opinion may justify exclusion of the dying declaration if
the offensive language cannot be excised. If the declaration is offered in the defendant's favor, this danger is
absent.' 6
1 144 Tex. Crim. 585, 165 S.W. 2d 184, 186 (1942). The dying declaration
which was branded a "conclusion" and to which the quotation noted in
text referred was, "Please don't blame Bob; I was as much to blame as
he was - you know he had been sick for so long and didn't have a job.
He felt like the world was down on him - I aggravated him."
'5In Commonwealth v. Knable, 369 Pa. 171, 85 A. 2d 114, 117 (1952), the
Pennsylvania court, a proponent of the modern trend, excluded a dying
declaration containing an opinion because it "did not concern the circumstances of the declarant's injuries." In citing this opinion in the subject
case, it is hoped that the Maryland court has Indicated an intention to
carefully examine each dying declaration wherein an opinion is given
to determine whether or not it contains any hearsay infirmities, rather
than simply excluding all dying declarations containing opinions.
16In Haney v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 178 (1883), the dying
declaration was, "I did not think the Negro would kill me; I was to
blame for the whole thing." - admitted; in Stewart v. Commonwealth,
235 'Ky. 670, 32 S.W. 2d 29, 31 (1930), "You have accidentally shot me...
and the gun went off and accidentally shot me." - admitted; in State v.
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Whether or not the opinion is accompanied by supporting facts has also been considered as a controlling factor
in determining the admissibility of dying declarations. 7
The courts reason that with the ingredient of added facts
the jury will be able to weigh the opinion and thus offset
much of its prejudicial effects. In extreme situations such
considerations may render a dying declaration in opinion
form so unreliable or dangerous that exclusion is justified.
However, it would seem that usually, with proper cautionary instructions to the jury, the risk of these harmful
possibilities is outweighed by the advantage of getting
the crucial story of the dying declarant before the trier
of fact.
Although the modern trend is away from it, the traditional view in the United States has been that opinions
of witnesses are generally inadmissible. Courts adhering
to this view often apply it as well to opinions of declarants
in dying declarations.' 8 Since the dying declaration is a
substitute for sworn testimony, this view requires it to
satisfy the requirements of sworn testimony. 9 Since the
right of cross-examination is missing, it is impossible to
determine the grounds upon which the declarant's opinions
may have been predicated." This aspect of unreliability
causes some courts to reject them.2 ' The jury, it is feared,
Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 'So. 270, 273 (1898), the court said: "the rules
relative to the admissibility of such declarations are not to be as rigorously
applied when . . . they are in favor of the accused, as when they are
sought to be urged against him"; see also, 40 C.J.S. 1278, Homicide, § 299.
"The
cases include Sweat v. State, 107 Ga. 712, 33 'S.E. 422 (1899),
where the court rejects a dying declaration but intimates that had it been
accompanied by facts, it might have been admissible; State v. Proctor,
269 S.W. 2d 624, 630 (Mo. 1954), where declarant characterized the act
as "accidental," the court stated that "accidental" standing alone was
objectionable as a conclusion but since all of the surrounding facts were
in as evidence, the declaration was admissible. Of. State v. Lee, 58 S.C.
335, 36 S.E. 706 (1900), where the court admitted the dying declaration
that the shdoting was "willful and malicious" even though it was not
accompanied by facts because testimony of others at the trial tended to
show that the declarant had within his knowledge facts on which he
might have based his opinion.
"1 WHARTON, CRimIIAL EViDENoE (12th ed. 1955) § 309; 2 JONES,
EVIDENCu (5th ed. 1958) § 305.
"State v. Wright, 112 Iowa 436, 84 N.W. 541, 544 (1900). The dying
declaration was that declarant thought defendant crazy and that he did
not believe that accused intended to shoot him. In reference to this, the
court said, "Declarations made under the solemn sense of approaching
death are only competent as to facts which the witness might testify to if
living." Riddle v. State, 210 Ark. 255, 196 S.W. 2d 226, 229 (1946).
20Jones v. State, 21 Ala. App. 33, 104 So. 878 (1925).
2Another reason, previously mentioned for excluding dying declarations
in opinion form, is the prejudicial effect the opinion sometimes has upon the
jury. In the Words of Mr. Justice Oardozo, "The reverberating clang of
those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds." Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
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will often take the opinion of the declarant to be conclusive
and close its ears to other testimony.
There are cases which identify the problem as one of
the opinion rule, point out no valid special circumstances
justifying exclusion, but still exclude dying declarations
simply because they are in opinion form.2 In these cases
the courts were squarely faced with the problem of choosing between the traditional view which excludes dying
declarations containing opinions and the modern trend
which admits such dying declarations - and they choose
the former.
The modern view,23 of which the instant case is an
example, holds that dying declarations, if admissible in
all aspects other than their recital of opinions, are admissible notwithstanding such recital. The growing acceptance of dying declarations in opinion form can be analogized to the evolution of the opinion rule itself. At one time
the opinion rule was regarded mainly as a rule of exclusion; consequently, it could be argued that if an opinion
was to be categorically rejected when presented by a witness in court, it should also be rejected when offered as a
dying declaration. However, today the opinion rule is
looked upon as being a rule of preference requiring witnesses, wherever meaning can be conveyed as effectively
to the trier of fact, to state facts rather than opinions since
such opinions are superfluous and can be as readily reached
by the jury as by the witness. 2 4 When the witness is in
court it is always possible for counsel to reframe the question to avoid harmful opinions. This is not true of dying
declarations and to reject such declarations "mistakes the
function of the opinion rule and may shut out altogether a
valuable item of proof. ' '25 It is indeed impossible to require
the declarant to restate his observations in the form of
2In
Gardner v. State, 55 Fla. 25, 45 So. 1028, 1029 (1908), the dying
declaration, "She shot me on purpose," was excluded. There, the husband
(decedent) chased his wife, who took a pistol she had in her possession,
turned and shot her husband. In People v. Alexander, 161 Mich. 645,
126 N.W. 837, 838 (1910), the dying declaration, "My husband deliberately
shot me," was excluded.
In Pippin v. Commonwealth, 117 Va. 919, 86 S.E. 152, 154 (1915), the
court broadly intimated that Virginia admits opinions. Going a step
further, the court stated in Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676,
109 S.E. 201 (1921) that a "dying declaration is not inadmissible in
evidence merely because it states a conclusion of fact." Cf. Davis v.
Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 809, 265 S.W. 316, 318 (1924). A stronger statement may be found in Commonwealth v. Knable, supra, n. 15, 117, where
the court said "the 'pinion rule has no application to dying declarations."
See also Commonwealth v. Plubell, 367 Pa. 452, 80 A. 2d 825, 828 (1951).

25 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE

(3d ed. 1940) § 1447.
(1954), § 18.
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facts;26 therefore, the opinion is not superfluous and the
declaration is admitted on the basis of necessity. 7 The
trier of fact should not be deprived of the declaration, for
what it is worth, even though in the form of an opinion,
if it meets all the requirements of an admissible dying
declaration.
LAuRENCE M. KATz
Recovery For Physical Injury Resulting From
Fright Without Impact
Battalla v. State'
Infant plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at Bellayre
Mountain Ski Center by a state employee who failed to
secure and properly lock the belt intended to protect the
occupant. As a result of this negligence the child became
frightened and hysterical upon descent and suffered "consequential injuries." Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of
Claims of New York.2 The State's motion to dismiss the
claim was denied. 3 The State appealed, and the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, reversed the order and dismissed
the claim.' Claimant appealed, and a divided Court of
Appeals, in overruling a previous decision to the contrary,
held that the claim stated a cause of action.5
Indeed the declarant when he made the declaration might not have
been able to state the facts because of his physical condition.
27

5 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra,

n.

24:

"The theory of that rule [opinion rule] is that, wherever the witness
can state specifically the detailed facts observed by him, the inferences to be drawn from them can equally well be drawn by the jury,
so that the witness' inferences become superfluous. Now, since the
declarant is here deceased, it is no longer possible to obtain from him
by questions any more detailed data than his statement may contain,
and hence his inferences are not in this instance superfluous, but
are indispensable."
110 N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961).
'17 Misc. 2d 548, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 1016 (1959). New York has a general
waiver of immunity statute which provides that the tort liability of the
state is to be determined in accordance with the same rules of law as
applied to an action against an individual or corporation. N.Y. CT. CL.
Act § 8; see also MoK-uNEY, N.Y. CONST. Art. 6, § 23. See Note, Liability
Of Municipal Corporations Under The State's Statutory Waiver Of Tort
Immunity, 20 Md. L. Rev. 353 (1960).
8 The Court of Claims was of the opinion that Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), which had held there can be no
recovery for injuries, physical or mental, incurred by fright negligently
induced, should be overruled.
'11 A.D. 2d 613, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1960). The court stated that the
case was controlled by Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., ibid.
'The claim stated that the plaintiff suffered "severe emotional and
neurological disturbances with residual physical manifestations ....
"
Battella v. State, supra, n. 1.

